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Abstract
Writing at a time when women had few property rights, were given scarce
educational opportunities, and were viewed as incorrigibly irrational, the largely
autodidactic English intellectual Margaret Cavendish is fascinated by knowledge and
how to secure for herself a place in the micro- as well as macrocosmic community of
letters. In particular, Cavendish holds an abiding interest in what we now call
“consciousness” which she attributes to every piece of matter. Throughout the universe,
the three aspects of matter—inanimate, sensate, and rational—are omnipresent. While
throughout all of Cavendish’s eclectic literary creation, consciousness is the unifying
principle. Her exploration of consciousness manifests itself across genres—in scenes
from her fiction, in the themes of her poetry, in her philosophical principles, and in her
explanations of the natural world. I maintain that although this is not commonly
recognized, Cavendish’s principle of pervasive consciousness is a premise throughout her
writings.

ii

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my family and friends for all the support they have given
me; I could never have made it through with out them. I would also like to particularly
single out Eric Larson for his editing, Jeff Moser for being my go-to person, Ruth
Chaikin for her never-ending assistance, and Michael Naydan for his direction.

iii

Table of Contents
Chapter One: Introduction .................................................................................................. 1
Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1
Chapter Two: Margaret Cavendish, her life ....................................................................... 3
Chapter Three: An Explanation of Terms ......................................................................... 20
States of the Self ................................................................................................... 20
Terms for Academic Disciplines .......................................................................... 26
Chapter Four: A Background to Cavendish’s Philosophy ................................................ 29
Chapter Five: An Overview of how Margaret Cavendish’s Explorations Help Further the
Development of Intersubjectivity in Literature, and thus Consciousness in Literature .... 45
Chapter Six: Margaret Cavendish, her writing ................................................................. 59
Chapter Seven: Conclusion ............................................................................................... 77
Works Cited ...................................................................................................................... 81

iv

Chapter One: Introduction
Introduction
Writing at a time when women had few property rights, were given scarce
educational opportunities, and were viewed as incorrigibly emotional and irrational, the
largely autodidactic English intellectual Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle
(1623-1673), is fascinated by knowledge and how to secure for herself a place in the
micro- as well as macrocosmic community of letters. In particular, Cavendish holds an
abiding interest in what we now call “consciousness” which she attributes to every piece
of matter. Accordingly, she maintains that Nature as megacosm is coextensive with all of
consciousness while individuals know only their own matter and, thus, themselves best;
as such, other “centers of unified sense and reason”1 (selves or consciousnesses) are
increasingly more difficult to know the more they differ in nature or composition. Her
exploration of consciousness manifests itself across genres—in scenes from her fiction, in
the themes of her poetry, in her philosophical principles, and in her attempts to explain
the natural world. I maintain that although this is not commonly recognized, Cavendish’s
principle of pervasive consciousness is a premise throughout her writings.

1

Karen Detlefsen’s phrase for Cavendish’s view of an individual’s sense of individuality
and awareness, "Margaret Cavendish on the Relation between God and World," (426).
1

I explore Cavendish’s biography and writings to highlight her premise: reason,
sense, and matter co-exist everywhere; therefore, every thing has a type of selfknowledge. Through sense and reason, each unified center becomes aware of its self and
its environment. Cavendish portrays many unified centers and their worldviews in her
fiction from equestrian dukes to cross-dressing women warriors, from lice-men to human
organs, from oaks to hares, and even from moral qualities to a world that exists in an
earring. She develops how all have full and varied existences, but how none is ever
completely knowledgeable or all-powerful. In her philosophy she constructs how matter
is all that exists, that there are no immaterials, and an overview of how the whole
functions. Throughout all the universe, the three aspects of matter—inanimate, sensate,
and rational—are omnipresent. And throughout all of Cavendish’s eclectic literary
creation, consciousness is the unifying principle.
The thesis will be divided into seven sections: 1) this introduction; 2) a discussion
of Margaret Cavendish and her life; 3) an explanation of terms; 4) a background to
Cavendish’s philosophy; 5) an overview of how Margaret Cavendish’s explorations help
further the development of Intersubjectivity in literature, and thus consciousness in
literature; 6) Margaret Cavendish, her writing; and 7) a conclusion.

2

Chapter Two: Margaret Cavendish, her life
Margaret Lucas Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle, is a highly autobiographical
writer. She writes abundant prefaces and she addresses her readers often throughout her
texts. However, her presence is even more pervasive than dedicatory materials; it is coextensive throughout her writings. As Emma Rees explains in her book, Margaret
Cavendish: Gender, Genre, Exile: “Her voice does not remain in the liminal, confined
space of the peritext, but seeps into the body of each publication.”2 As such, an overview
of the Duchess’s life is instrumental to understanding her work and her persistent
exploration of what consciousness is and where it exists. Whereas Rees in her book
concentrates on Cavendish’s development of matters related to gender, genre, and exile, I
will concentrate on gender, genre, and consciousness. Whereas, it is true Cavendish lived
a type of exile during her whole life, it is also true that throughout her days she
questioned what it is to be aware of one’s existence and thus to be aware that one knows
that one exists. As Lisa T. Sarasohn explains in her book The Natural Philosophy of
Margaret Cavendish, “Cavendish could reply to Descartes: I am, therefore I think.”3 For
Cavendish, existence equates consciousness.

2

Emma L. E. Rees. Margaret Cavendish: Gender, Genre, Exile, (27).

3

Lisa T. Sarasohn. The Natural Philosophy of Margaret Cavendish: Reason and Fancy
During the Scientific Revolution, (193).
3

Cavendish’s life can be divided into four thematic epochs: her Lucas family
upbringing, her time of waiting on Queen Henrietta Maria, her married life in exile, and
her married life after the Restoration. As an overview, her childhood was spent in a very
close-knit patrician family that had a clear division between males and females. Her
attendance on the Queen was short, only two years, but it was instrumental in teaching
her more about her priorities, values, and shortcomings on the personal level, and about
courtly life on a social level. Her married life in exile, full of homesickness and economic
uncertainty, felicitously provided her with intellectual stimulation, even though in some
ways it continued to be insular. Once back in England, Cavendish was able to continue
her intellectual pursuits with more security. All four epochs influenced her thoughts and
writings.
The youngest of eight children, Margaret Lucas was born in 1623 to Thomas and
Elizabeth Lucas. Even though Margaret esteemed her brothers, she did not know them
well because there was a great age difference between them and herself, and also as a
result of the custom that boys were schooled quite differently and separately from the
girls. She was twenty-five years younger than her eldest brother and ten years younger
than the youngest. She writes in her autobiography: “As for my brothers, of whom I had
three, I know not how they were bred.”4 Even though Cavendish’s ostensive purpose in
“A True Relation of my Birth, Breeding, and Life” is to portray the nobility of all of the

4

See Cavendish, “A True Relation of my Birth, Breeding, and Life” found in Paper
Bodies edited by Sylvia Bowerbank and Sara Mendelson, (43).
4

Lucases’ descent and upbringing,5 she seems to regret the differences in educational
possibilities6 wondering what deeds she could have done and what thoughts she could
have produced with a more academic background. Many of her works of fiction are an
investigation into women of noble upbringing’s possibilities, often incorporating into
these female characters different traits deemed as “masculine” in her time. As a result,
gender traits and expectations, as well as terms such as “princely,” “hermaphrodite,” and
“monster” indicate important themes throughout the Duchess’s thought.
Cavendish makes it clear that whereas her brothers were instructed and supported
in active endeavors, Margaret and her four sisters learned how to be gracious, dress well,
and the bare fundamentals of reading and writing. Through her autobiography, Cavendish
develops the picture of the Lucas women existing in a paradoxical active passivity. They
did not learn what the men learned or interact with the outside world. They did not even
learn what affluent, non-aristocratic women learned; it was as if learning anything of
practical value would diminish their station. They rarely interacted with other families, as
if they maintained they were a perfect society in and of themselves. She reminisces:
As for tutors, although we had for all sorts of Vertues, as singing, dancing,
playing on Musick, reading, writing, working [needlework], and the like, yet we

5

Cavendish wrote about her descent that her “Father was a Gentleman, which Title is
grounded and given by Merit, not by Princes; and ‘tis the act of Time, not Favour,” ibid p
41. She and her sisters “were bred Vertuously, Modestly, Civilly, Honorably, and on
honest principles,” (42). Her brothers “loved Virtue, endeavour’d Merit, practic’d Justice,
and spoke Truth; they were constantly Loyal, and truly Valiant …” ibid (43-4).
6

Ibid, “the breeding of men were after different manner of wayes from those of women,”
(43).
5

were not kept strictly thereto, they were rather for formalitie than benefit, for
my Mother cared not so much for our dancing and fidling, singing and prating
of severall languages; as that we should be bred virtuously, modestly, civilly,
honorably, and on honest principles.7
From the superior judgment implied in “prating” as well as the diminishment of the other
“Vertues,” Cavendish depicts women who feel entitled to be worshipped strictly as a
result of their essential nobility and beauty. Tellingly, this attestation to a patrician
upbringing is written with numerous spelling errors; the form may belie the content.
Nonetheless, the Lucas women’s lives seem vacuous. With little interaction to the outside
world and its concerns, but also no access to its knowledge, how could they learn to
embody the principles the mother ostensibly valued? The women seemed to exist in a
world of stagnant self-esteem. Cavendish may have become conscious of this in her later
years.
Cavendish also alludes to the purpose of a woman’s life as held by many in her
day which also seems to be always tacit in her family’s view of females: a woman’s
purpose is explicitly to supplement, uphold, and adorn the men in her life. The Duchess
often gives voice to this female duty in her texts even though it is almost always
counterpoised by discordant points of view. On the second page of her “Orations of
Divers Sorts, Accommodated to Divers Places,” Cavendish explains that “all the parts of
the whole” are dedicated to her husband, William Cavendish, Marquis of Newcastle (later
Duke). She finishes thus: “for I have dedicated myself and all my actions to your
7

Ibid, (43).
6

Lordship, as becomes/ Your Lordship’s honest wife and humble servant.”8 Cavendish
here, as she often does, makes a show of her indebtedness and humility. It is unclear,
however, how sincere her feelings of little worth truly are and how much they are a
rhetorical and political move.
Another example of this societal tendency is seen in Cavendish’s character’s
speech by one of the seven women speakers in “Female Orations, Part XI”:
[W]e women are much more favoured by Nature than men, in giving us such
beauties, features, shapes, graceful demeanour, and such insinuating and
enticing attractions, as men are forced to admire us, love us and be desirous of
us, insomuch as rather than not have and enjoy us, they will deliver to our
disposals their power, persons, and lives, enslaving themselves to our will and
pleasures; also we are their saints, whom they adore and worship, and what can
we desire more than to be men’s tyrants, destinies, and goddesses?9
Once again, women exist in an active passivity: there is nothing they can do as much as
instantiate beauty. They must develop their comportment in such a way so that by their
very essence, they enslave men to them. The corollary seems to be that if a woman is
born without beauty, position, demeanor, and wealth, she has little hope of embodying
any power in her own life. This perspective complements Cavendish’s emphasis on
nobility: some beings are born essentially better and more capable.
As is typical in Cavendish’s writings, she presents an ambiguous contrast to the
actively passive woman: her own mother, Elizabeth Leighton Lucas. In her

8

See Cavendish, “Orations of Divers Sorts, Accommodated to Divers Places,” (115).

9

Ibid, (251).
7

autobiography, she depicts her mother as being quite capable of dealing with the
management of a large estate and family, especially after the early death of her husband:
[A]nd though she would often complain, that her family was too great for her
weak Management, and often prest my Brother to take it upon him, yet I
observe she took a pleasure, and some little pride in the governing thereof; she
was skillful in Leases and setting of Lands, and Court-keeping, ordering of
Stewards, and the like affaires.10
Cavendish presents a complicated woman who complains in such a way that her family
could see past her obvious requests for help to her true feelings towards her worldly
duties: she felt capable of doing them and received a feeling of satisfaction from a job
well-done. There is the understanding that Leighton Lucas complained because she felt
that her society demanded a woman to be passive, that a woman could only perform such
work under practical duress to provide for her family; therefore, the mother made a show
of emphasizing that apparently she was the only person available to fulfill that crucial
task and this granted her the permission to continue to do so.
The Lucas family was staunchly royalist. Subsequently, Cavendish’s
belief in monarchy would become an integral part of her philosophy and of her literature.
Even though her family was well off, her father Thomas Lucas only earned a title later in
life. As a result, some individuals in the nobility saw Cavendish as a social climber since
she married above her original station. William Cavendish was a marquis when they
married; later, he would become the 1st Duke of Newcastle-upon-Tyne for loyal services

10

Cavendish, “A True Relation of my Birth, Breeding, and Life,” p. 49
8

to the crown. As such, the Lucas family’s monarchism in general and Cavendish’s belief
in aristocracy in particular have many complicated nuances that play into her worldview
and philosophy.
The Lucas family suffered many losses for their loyalty to King Charles I and
Queen Henrietta Maria: lands, houses, income, and homeland. Cavendish laments that
she was never even able to gaze upon her mother’s and sister’s ashes after having missed
their funerals because of her exile on the Continent. These were lost during the Civil War
when the people from the town who sided with the Parliamentarians against the Royalists
attacked the Lucas manor and desecrated the tombs at the family home of St. John’s near
Colchester. For her brother, Charles Lucas, his royalism caused his death. In 1648, he
was shot after the three-month siege of Colchester during the Second English Civil War.
He was executed, along with fellow military officer Sir George Lisle, to discourage other
men from being loyal to the monarchy. The royalist camp considered both men martyrs
and wrote songs and poetry in their honor. After the Restoration in 1666, he was awarded
a peerage and became Sir Charles Lucas. The eldest brother, Sir Thomas Lucas, suffered
a severe head-wound in battle as well which, even though he survived, shortened his
life.11

11

See Cavendish “A True Relation of my Birth, Breeding, and Life”: “But this unnatural
War came like a Whirlwind, which fell’d down their Houses, where some in the Wars
were crusht to death, as my youngest Brother Sir Charles Lucas, and my brother Sir
Thomas Lucas; and though my Brother Sir Thomas Lucas died not immediately of his
Wounds, yet a Wound he received on his head in Ireland shortened his life,” p. 5.
9

After hearing that Queen Henrietta Maria no longer had the number of attendants
to which she was accustomed, Cavendish’s monarchism motivated her to beseech her
mother for parental permission to pay attendance on the queen. In 1643, the young
Margaret arrived to Merton College, Oxford, where the royals had repaired for safety
from the insurgents to become the Queen’s maid-of-honor. At the royal “camp,” the
twenty-year-old ingenue was lost in the effervescent and critical banter from the
courtiers, ladies, and visitors with which the Queen surrounded herself. After her two
year attendance, Cavendish accepted the fact that she would never quite be able to fit in;
she was shy, naïve, and too serious. “Attending on the queen, Margaret frequently
observed the ‘great factions both amongst the courtiers and soldiers,’ but she later
realized that she had been too young fully to understand the complex and devious
machinations of all ‘their intrigues.’”12 She seems to have been disappointed about what
royal life entailed.
A year later, after the loss of the Royalists at the Battle of Marston Moor, Queen
Henrietta Maria and her entourage escaped to Paris. It was in France, that Cavendish met
the widower who was to become her husband—Marquis William Cavendish, Marquess
of Newcastle. Newcastle was a prominent loyalist who fought in many battles, taught
Prince Charles II to ride, and provided entertainment for the monarchs as well. Even
though he was thirty years older than Margaret, they had a mutually supportive

12

Whitaker, Katie. Mad Madge: The Extraordinary Life of Margaret Cavendish, Duchess
of Newcastle, the First Woman to Live by Her Pen, (24).
10

relationship. His tutelage, connections, and prefaces that he wrote for her books were
instrumental to her intellectual growth and output. Newcastle wrote poetry, plays, and
treatises on such varied topics as good leadership as well as equestrianism. He was also a
patron to several important English writers including Jonson, Davenant, and Dryden, as
well as the philosophers Hobbes, Gassendi, and Descartes. Newcastle and his brother
Charles Cavendish often entertained writers and philosophers for meals and long
discussions. Cavendish esteemed her brother-in-law mentioning him in her poems and
dedicating works to him. Charles was well-versed in Mathematics and Philosophy; he
greatly influenced and supported Cavendish.13
Cavendish’s presence at Newcastle’s meals and conversations meant that she had
social contact with many intellectual figures; however, since she was shy, spoke only
English, and often played the woman’s part of being silent, it is not known how much she
actually participated. We do know that she both questioned and spoke with her husband
and brother-in-law about basic concepts and eventually engaged them in more advanced
discussions. As newlyweds they lived in Paris for three years and later at the prince’s
behest moved to the Netherlands in both Rotterdam and Antwerp for 12 years. In
Antwerp they lived in Peter Paul Rubens’ house “Rubenshuis” renting it from his widow.

13

See Anna Battigelli’s Margaret Cavendish and the Exiles of the Mind: “He [Charles
Cavendish] was such an active and engaged correspondent that Miriam Reik
appropriately calls him one of the seventeenth century’s ‘philosophical merchants’” and
“Psychologically, too, Charles Cavendish had all the characteristics of an ideal tutor,
despite his disadvantageous physical stature—he was hunchbacked and dwarfish.
Clarendon singles out his ‘gentleness of disposition, the humility and meekness of his
nature, and the vivacity of his wit,’” p. 47.
11

In 1660, Margaret and William Cavendish finally return to England after 16 years
in exile. Newcastle had hoped to become part of Charles II’s trusted advisors and had
even written him a small book along the lines of Machiavelli’s The Prince,14 but the new
king gave him different sinecures, returned his lands, and thought that was more than
sufficient.15 On March 16, 1665, King Charles II granted William and Margaret the title
of Duke and Duchess of Newcastle as a repayment for moneys William had lent Charles I
in 1639.16 Katie Whitaker, a biographer of Cavendish, explains how during this time the
Newcastles went to London and spent exorbitant amounts of money on goods. One object
they invested in was a portrait of Cavendish by Peter Lely. Whitaker explains, “[T]his
was an image of grandeur, rank, authority, and wealth, created to celebrate the
Newcastles’ recent rise to the top of the ladder of aristocratic status.”17 Cavendish had at
last found herself in a position of enormous economic and social strength. Even though

14

Katie Whitaker. Mad Madge: The Extraordinary Life of Margaret Cavendish, Duchess
of Newcastle, the First Woman to Live by Her Pen, p. 223.
15

Ibid, “Eventually William received some regard for his long loyalty to the king when,
on September 21, 1660, he attended the court at Whitehall to be sworn in as a gentleman
of the bedchamber. This was one of the highest court appointments… But for William the
post was a sinecure—at once symbolizing the king’s favor and bringing a salary of
£1,000 per annum. A job of more real power came his way on October 1, when Charles II
made him lord lieutenant of Nottinghamshire…William would return home to Welbeck
as the most important man in his county…” (233).
16

Ibid, William had to give £887 to Charles II to make up the difference to the amount
that the king normally charged for dukedoms, (262).
17

Ibid, (263).
12

her new life was not without trials, she took advantage of the benefits it gave her and she
published five new books and revised others before her death in 1673.
There are general tendencies throughout Cavendish’s life that attest to the
importance in her life of gender, genre, and consciousness. Firstly, Cavendish was very
conscious of being a woman and what that meant for her position in society. This
influenced her literary and philosophical texts. She addressed the issues of which roles
women were allowed to fulfill in society, what marriage meant for women, how women
were excluded from nearly every avenue of education, and how all of these conditions
were based on and perpetuated through arbitrary conventions, not necessity. As a result
of her travels abroad, Margaret garnered an appreciation for the different roles women
can take and this may have encouraged her to place her heroines in unique roles outside
the accepted norm for English letters. While living in the Netherlands she was fascinated
by a woman who played “‘the best female actor that I ever saw,’ utterly convincing
whether she appeared in her petticoats or dressed as a man in doublet and breeches.”18
This unnamed actress, the wife of a common itinerant, believably acted out the roles even
of men; in other words, she was almost capable of inhabiting the consciousness of other
people. Cavendish was so intrigued by the actress’s ability to embody others that she

18

Katie Whitaker. Mad Madge: The Extraordinary Life of Margaret Cavendish, Duchess
of Newcastle, the First Woman to Live by Her Pen, (212-3).
13

rented out “a room overlooking the stage and went every day to watch their
performances” although she could not understand a word of the foreign language.19
The actress fascinates Cavendish for being so eminently capable in her job, for
her ability to act the part of man or woman, and for her utter individuality. I suggest that
the Duchess strives to embody these very characteristics in her own life as well
maintaining that these qualities invest one with uniqueness and power above and beyond
gender. Rees affirms Cavendish’s obsession for the latter, being seen as unique, in
Margaret Cavendish Gender, Genre, and Exile:
Her determination to be so present in her texts has much to do with her
anomalousness: far from being an impediment to her, the singularity in which
she delighted proved, during the hazardous years of the middle of the
seventeenth century, to be the very means by which she could make her voice
and contentious opinions heard.20
Being an extraordinarily doted woman, gives both the actor and the philosopher a stage
from which to speak and to be heard. Nicole Pohl observes in her essay on The Blazing
World that Cavendish “elevates the (female) subject to a new non-gendered and singular
status and thus finally creates a truly emancipatory poetic space.”21 She thus builds a
metaphorical space that she envisions as hermaphroditic with characteristics of both
genders, but more importantly, characterized by singularly itself. “Her concept of

19

Ibid, 213. Also see Margaret Cavendish, Sociable Letters, (261-2).

20

Emma L. E. Rees. Margaret Cavendish: Gender, Genre, Exile, (23).

21

Nicole Pohl. “’Of Mixt Natures’: Questions of Genre in Margaret Cavendish’s The
Blazing World,” (51).
14

hermaphroditism in fact contains three elements: the male, the female, and the individual,
developing a triangular discourse.”22 I suggest that Cavendish searched to create this
space of strength in her own life by means of her writings and her actions.
That space, however, is only open to the very few. Even though the actress is
spectacular and singular, she will never have any real power because of her essential lack
of nobility. She may act the part, but Cavendish, it is understood, truly embodies every
one of those qualities. Singularity and inherent superiority are essential for success.
“Cavendish’s self-presentation means that she attempts to emancipate herself and
delineate her own right to discourse. The female advancement her words afford is
singular.”23 It is so unusual and exclusive a space that no one can occupy it except the
Duchess herself.
Secondly, gender is associated with genre throughout Cavendish’s oeuvre. She
questioned norms in dress, speech, and gender relations in her own life while developing
in her literary output a corresponding experimentation. “Cavendish was arguably the first
Englishwoman to fashion herself as an author—a woman who desired, and achieved,
publication on an unprecedented scale, and in a wide variety of literary genres.”24 Not
only does she write poetry, drama, fiction, philosophy, and scientific investigations, she

22

Ibid, (54).

23

Emma L. E. Rees. Margaret Cavendish: Gender, Genre, Exile, (169).

24

Stephen Clucas, ed. A Princely Brave Woman: Essays on Margaret Cavendish,
Duchess of Newcastle, (1).
15

intermixed within the same text different modalities. Once again as she creates a place for
the unique individual, she also makes a place for the unique text. Even though she
intermixed many different styles, the two most divergent forms she continuously blends
are what she calls reason and fancy, texts on philosophy or what we now call science and
texts that largely come from the imagination. This is how Cavendish could come to write
The Description of a New World, Called The Blazing World, often identified as the first
work of science fiction.
Sometimes her exploration of genres can seem excessive leading one to question
why she does not focus her output in order to establish herself in one area. “But since
Cavendish thought that reason and fancy existed along a continuum of conception and
imagination, she felt entitled, and sometimes required, to explore the implications of all
her ideas in all possible genres.”25 Cavendish anchored her output, therefore, to her
individuality. I posit that Cavendish had a developed sense that individuality is intimately
tied to a sense of self, to consciousness, a connection to which we will now turn.
In conclusion to Cavendish’s life story, I will revisit how she constantly inserts
herself within her texts by tying it again to the actress that could embody any dramatic
part; this capability impressed the Duchess and supported her developing views on
consciousness. This talent complemented that of one of her favorite writers who also
possessed chameleon-like abilities, William Shakespeare. In her book CCXI Sociable

25

Sarasohn, Lisa T. The Natural Philosophy of Margaret Cavendish: Reason and Fancy
During the Scientific Revolution, (78).
16

Letters, Cavendish enthuses about how the Bard is able to depict individual
consciousnesses and even utilize the characters’ very ways of being as essential aspects
of the story line.
Shakespear did not want Wit to Express to the Life all Sorts of Persons, of what
Quality, Profession, Degree, Breeding, or Birth soever; nor did he want Wit to
Express the Divers, and Different Humours, or Natures, or Several Passions in
Mankind ; and so Well he hath Express’d in his Playes all Sorts of Persons, as
one would think he had been Transformed into every one of those persons he
hath Described; and as sometimes one would think he was Really himself the
Clown or Jester he Feigns, so one would think he was also the King, and Privy
Counsellor; also as one would think he were Really the Coward he Feigns, so
one would think he were the most Valiant and Experienced Soldier… 26
Cavendish is not talking only about variety, but also about the depth of beings’ being,
their consciousness, and about how one person perceives him- or herself differently from
the inside than others do from the outside.
Cavendish is cited as writing “the first sustained evaluation of Shakespeare as
playwright”27 favoring him over Ben Jonson for his ability to portray how different
people truly are rather than as mere stock characters.28 Interior life or consciousness

26

Margaret Cavendish, Sociable Letters, (177).

27

Katherine Romack and James Fitzmaurice. Cavendish and Shakespeare:
Interconnections, (2).
28

Shannon Miller. “More critical of Jonson, Cavendish becomes an early voice in
elevating Shakespeare over Jonson, a move she makes that both participates in and may
help to shape the cultural debate about Shakespeare’s elevation into the playwright ‘for
all time.’” See “Thou Art a Monument Without a Tombe,” (9).
17

therefore comes to have an intrinsic value of its own.29 James Fitzmaurice in his
introduction to Sociable Letters explains: “Cavendish was not merely the first woman to
launch a serious and sustained critique of Shakespeare. She was the first person to do
so.”30 Cavendish looked beyond what Fitzmaurice calls “the Restoration distaste for
lower-class characters,”31 to esteem instead something she found remarkable:
Shakespeare’s ability to portray different types of selves which she attributes to
Shakespeare’s understanding of nature. She writes in a prologue to her plays: “Yet Gentle
Shakespear had a fluent Wit/ Although less Learning, yet full well he writ/ For all his
Playes were writ by Natures light,/ Which gives his Readers, and Spectators sight.”32 She
is discussing about much more than mere types; she is expressing how Shakespeare
actually becomes other people through an understanding of individual consciousnesses.
She insinuates, therefore, that Shakespeare’s knowledge is of a deeper, more valuable
kind since it reflects Nature’s understanding of how the universe functions.
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Margaret Cavendish. 123 of CCXI Sociable Letters Written by the Thrice Noble,
Illustrious, and Excellent Princess, the Lady Marchioness of Newcastle (London, 1664)
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and Other Plays, p. 265.
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Interestingly, Cavendish wrote her evaluation of Shakespeare in her book CCXI
Sociable Letters, a text that complements her Philosophical Letters, and which was
published in the same year. The former pragmatically deals with real, though veiled, lives
while the latter looks at how reason can make sense of the physical world. Consequently,
the first is much more fancy; the second, intellect. This is important for our purpose
because according to Cavendish, knowledge consists of biography, society, nature, and
the manner in which mind makes a whole of everything in order to build a base from
which the individual can act, live, and create. Biography is bound to consciousness and
consciousness to one’s gender and innate quality. As such, mere experimental science
will never be capable of reaching such heights. Such depth of understanding can be
investigated and expressed in literature or art only by a person of unique individuality and
nobility. The actress embodied knowledge of individuals’ natures and manners, but could
never hope to delve deeply into deeper wisdom. Shakespeare, on the other hand, was
such an artist; Cavendish maintains that she is such a force of nature, as well.
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Chapter Three: An Explanation of Terms
With such a varied oeuvre that intermixed genres and consistently strived for
being original, Cavendish offers many areas for study. I have chosen to direct myself,
however, to the area that I find to be a unifying theme to all her writings: consciousness.
Since the English language has changed so much from Cavendish’s time to now, I
include a glossary that has two purposes: to define words that Cavendish used in
particular ways that differ from our use today and to define words in order to justify my
employment of current lexicon that would have been anachronistic in her time. I present
these terms under two headings—those that deal with intrapersonal states (States of the
Self) and those that deal with communal areas of study (Terms for Academic
Disciplines).

States of the Self
Consciousness: Cavendish addresses and even wrestles with the awareness of one’s self
and interaction with one’s environment through many techniques and genres, but she
never uses the term “consciousness.” She consistently portrays how entities, both human
and other, use different aspects of their rationality to exist and move through their
environments. Cavendish’s closest term for consciousness is a phrase—each part of
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matter has “self-motion, knowledge and perception.”33 These three aspects are further
explained below, but they basically correspond to matter’s active, rational, and sensing
faculties.
Cavendish questioned human nature and our place in the world during the period
of time that separated Descartes’ cogito, ergo sum in 1637 from John Locke’s depiction
of consciousness as “the perception of what passes in a man’s own mind”34 in 1690.
During this era, awareness of what one can know was of paramount concern to many
intellectuals; thus, examining the state of being aware that one knows, perceives, and
senses—consciousness—and then developing a term for it was a logical consequence. In
other words, I suggest many were developing an understanding of the concept of
awareness of self that eventually found the accepted term “consciousness.”
Even today, the understanding of the term “consciousness” still contains
ambiguities. Robert L. Solso in his book The Psychology of Art and the Evolution of the
Conscious Brain tries to clarify the meaning with the acronym AWAREness. The capital
letters stand for the prominent rung of attributes: Attention, Wakefulness, Architecture,
Recall of knowledge, and the Emotive. The second rung of attributes includes novelty,
emergence, selectivity, and subjectivity. Solso explains the purpose of the framework:
“…I hope to demystify this sometimes slippery concept…The five elements of
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Margaret Cavendish, Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, (30).
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John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (115).
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consciousness in the AWAREness model are an attempt to reduce the variance in
defining the subjective experience we call consciousness.”35
For the purpose of this thesis, when I speak about consciousness I rely on
Cavendish’s phrase ““self-motion, knowledge and perception,”36 and on Karen
Detlefsen’s characterization of Cavendish’s concept as a “center of unified sense and
reason.”37 Cavendish’s often uses the analogous terms of self-knowledge, perception,
sense, self-movement, mind, soul, and spirit, as well. These are intimately connected to
motion, knowledge and the senses and I define them briefly follow below.
Self-Knowledge: This is one of the components of Cavendish’s terminology for
consciousness. She explains, “[S]elf-knowledge, the ground of all perceptions, is a fixt,
and inherent, or innate knowledge…”38 In other words, for Cavendish self-knowledge has
an essential, unchanging quality which is not an unusual principle. What could be seen as
unique is her complete adherence to the tenet that matter is all there is; that means once a
particularly entity dies, the knowledge of that particular unity ceases to exist. The
individual parts continue to have self-knowledge as being individual parts, but they will
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consecutively once again become part of other larger entities and as such the “self” is not
constant.
Perception and Sense: Perception is another component of Cavendish’s tri-part
terminology for consciousness. It intimately connects to “sense” such that the senses are
the organs or the hardware that captures and processes the exterior information: whereas,
perception is the input itself. Perception is “exterior knowledge,”39 data about the world
that comes in through the senses of the body. The fact that there are different centers of
unified sense and reason is fundamental to Cavendish’s ontology. Without the separation
between parts and bodies, there could be no consciousness since everything would be one
heap of matter. Since there are different unities, information is localized and ignorance of
other entities exists which necessitates a process for gathering information about those
entities through senses in order to be able to continue as a particular center of unified
sense and reason. Cavendish explicates, “[I]n all natural actions, there is a commerce,
intercourse, or agreement of parts; which intercourse or agreement, cannot be without
perception or knowledge of each other.”40 Perceptions bring in information from the
exterior and allow for communication between matter.
Self-Movement: This is the final component of Cavendish’s terminology for
consciousness. It is in contradistinction to Western Philosophy’s longstanding principle
of the Prime Mover, of an originary force that set everything in the universe into
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movement (or in our day, the Big Bang). It is also in contradistinction to Thomas
Hobbes’ insistence on viewing the universe as composed of inert matter. Cavendish
explains, “[N]ature has infinite ways of motions whereof none is prime or principal, but
self-motion; which is the producer of all the varieties nature has within herself.”41 She
maintains that all change and movement in the universe originate in matter’s capacity for
self-motion and work in conjunction with matter’s other qualities of self-knowledge and
sense. As such, matter is never inert; its consciousness, which is completely composed of
self-knowledge, perception, and self-movement, is coextensive with all that exists. This
even extends to mental actions:
In short, conception, imagination, remembrance, experience,
observation, and the like, are all made by corporeal, self-knowing,
perceptive, self-motion, and not by insensible, irrational, dull, and
moveless matter.42
Self-motion, since it brings about the “interface” between entities, is also the catalyst for
communication.
Finally, self-knowledge, perception, and self-motion are coextensive and coexistent. “[B]ut no motion can be without perception, because every part or particle of
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nature, as it is self-moving, so it is also self-knowing and perceptive; for matter, selfmotion, knowledge and perception, are all but one thing…”43
Mind: For Cavendish, this is rational matter and all movements of the mind are rational
matter as well:
[T]he form or pattern in the architect’s mind, is as much material, as the
builded house itself; the only difference is, that the exemplar, or figure in
the mind, is formed of the rational matter only, which is the purest, finest,
and subtlest degree, and the other is made of grosser materials.44
Everything that exists in Cavendish’s view of the universe is matter; mind and actions of
the mind are composed of finer matter.
Soul: For Cavendish, this is the sensation of the rational process. “And this natural soul,
otherwise called reason, is nothing else but corporeal natural self-motion, or a particle of
the purest, most subtle and active part of matter…”45
Spirit: For Cavendish, this seems to be the moving part of matter. “[W]hat is there on
earth that is not wrought, or made into figures, and then undone again by these spirits?”46
Finally, mind, soul and spirit are coextensive and co-existent.
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Terms for Academic Disciplines
Contemplative or Speculative Philosophy: The investigation of truth through the intellect
and reason. It values discourse and disputation. Even though Experimental Philosophy
(see below) uses reason as well, it is too dependent upon factors beyond the academic’s
control: “And hence I conclude, that experimental and mechanic philosophy cannot be
above the speculative part, by reason most experiments have their rise from the
speculative, so that the artist or mechanic is but a servant to the student.”47
Natural Philosophy: This is a subset of Philosophy proper. It investigates the structure
and rules of nature, “a rational inquisition into the causes of natural affects.”48
Experimental Philosophy: The investigation of nature through setting up scientific
experiments. Important for Cavendish is that this is by means of the bodily senses which
are more fallible than reason is and, worse than that, there is the further filter of scientific
instruments. “[H]ow can a wise man trust his senses, if either the objects be not truly
presented according to their natural figure and shape, or if the senses be defective, either
through age, sickness, or other accidents, which do alter the natural motions proper to
each sense?”49
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Art: Margaret Cavendish’s term for experimental science. “Next, I say, that sense, which
is more apt to be deluded than reason, cannot be the ground of reason, no more than art
can be the ground of nature.”50 Even though she accepts the term to refer to any act of
manipulation and, thus, could include painting and literature, in Observations upon
Experimental Philosophy, she almost always means “experiments”: “And therefore, I
confess, I have but little faith in such arts, and as little in telescopical, microscopical, and
the like inspections; and prefer rational and judicious observations, before deluding
glasses and experiments…”51
Fancy: For Cavendish, fancy is the intellectual exercise of joining different mental
phenomena together to create what Cavendish calls a “hermaphroditic” conception, a
conjoining in the mind of different elements of different substances to create a new
whole. She writes: “[F]ancy or imagination is a voluntary action of reason, or of the
rational parts of nature…”52 Cavendish particularly employs the term “fancy” to stand for
imaginative literature. She gives fancy an extremely high value:
But mistake me not, when I distinguish Fancy from Reason; I mean not
as if Fancy were not made by the Rational parts of Matter; but by
Reason I understand a rational search and enquiry into the causes of
natural effects; and by Fancy a voluntary creation or production of the
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Mind, both being effects, or rather actions of the rational part of
Matter…53
Cavendish often intersperses works of literary fancy alongside works of more pure
academic interest; they support each other in the search for truth.
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Margaret Cavendish, The Blazing World and Other Writings, (152-3).
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Chapter Four: A Background to Cavendish’s Philosophy
I posit that Cavendish attempts to construct a stronger system of philosophy by
bridging the gap between the Cartesian supremacy of reason and the Hobbesian belief in
materialism. This gap, that causes an intellectual battle in the Duchess’s time between
whether to give precedence to mind/soul or precedence to matter54 has implications in
understanding human knowledge and thus consciousness. Cavendish believes that
Descartes loses any sense of locus where mind can ever interact with matter in his system
of thought when he so deliberately separates the immaterial soul from matter.55 For
Cavendish, the body with its senses of perception is necessarily an essential part of a
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Lisa T. Sarashon explains how Cavendish conceived of matter in her book The Natural
Philosophy of Margaret Cavendish: Reason and Fancy During the Scientific Revolution.
“…Cavendish described matter as infinite and eternal and having control over itself,
eliminating the necessity of either Nature or her ministers. Cavendish also made it
independent of time: matter lives always in the present as a function of its eternity.
Moreover, it is unlimited and takes form only when divided by motion. In this sense, it
goes from the smallest to the largest, with the very smallest still sometimes described as
an atom. In a sense, matter absorbs the attributes of divinity: it is infinite, eternal,
omnipresent, and one,” (57).
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(197).
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being’s knowledge of nature:56 in other words, the mind is not superimposed on an
automaton of matter.
Conversely, when Hobbes insists that only mechanics can cause movement, he
loses a connection where the mind, and thus consciousness, can truly be affected by
anything except by outside forces (which naturally include biological processes in the
brain); a mind, in other words, could never move itself. Cavendish maintains that
consciousness has the ability to bring about non-coerced motion on its own through
reason and fancy (Cavendish’s term for imagination), by what she calls voluntary
actions.57
Both Descartes and Hobbes’s systems deny essential properties of the Duchess’s
ontology; therefore, Cavendish does not choose one over the other. She constructs her
own philosophy. She suggests a property of existence that others championed before
her—matter and reason coexist throughout nature in each and every particle of matter.
Consequently, nothing is inert; everything that exists contains knowledge and, thus,
neither can reason exist without matter nor can matter exist without reason. In this way,
everything is matter, and mind still has freedom to act.
56

Cavendish’s privileging of nature sets her apart from her contemporaries. She conflates
both Nature as a personification of all that exists and nature as the essential qualities of a
substance. See Sarasohn in The Natural Philosophy of Margaret Cavendish: “Cavendish
reformulated the definition of nature in her works, mingling anthropomorphized
metaphors of nature as a woman with a depiction of matter as internally self-moving and
self-conscious” (9).
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Margaret Cavendish. Observations upon Experimental Philosophy. “[B]y voluntary
actions I understand self-actions; that is, such actions whose principle of motion is within
themselves, and doth not proceed from such an exterior agent…” (19).
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Cavendish examines different ways of becoming aware and interacting with the
material world as directly as possible through her senses, her intellect, and every
discipline of knowledge available to her.58 She states that her goal is to “find out truth, or
at least the probability of truth according to that proportion of sense and reason nature has
bestowed on me.”59 In several books, she explores natural philosophy, a term we
generally translate today as science, but that she took literally as the study of the wisdom
of Nature. She also criticizes what she calls Experimental Philosophy which would be
science that relies too much on experiments rather than logic and reason. Ultimately,
Cavendish maintains that the existence of consciousness is best attested to from a first
person perspective60 or by Nature herself.61
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Cavendish conflates a number of terms such as mind, knowledge, and soul, often using
all three similarly to how we currently use the word consciousness. See for example the
following passages from Observations: “the rational part, or the mind” (17); “parts of the
soul or mind, being all self-moving” (24); “nay, as there is difference in the corporeal
parts of their bodies, so in the corporeal parts of their minds, according to the old
proverb, ‘So many men, so many minds’: For there are different understandings, fancies,
conceptions, imaginations, judgments, wits, memories, affections, passions, and the like”
(85); “As infinite nature has an infinite self-motion and self-knowledge; so every part and
particle has a particular and finite self-motion and self-knowledge, by which it knows
itself, and its own actions, and perceives also other parts and actions…” (138), “that his
mind, or rational motions” (146); and “Reason must judge, sense execute; for reason is
the prime part of nature, as being the corporeal soul or mind of nature” (210).
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Ibid. “[F]or it is one thing to perceive the exterior figure of a creature, and another
thing to perceive its interior, proper, and innate actions: also it is one thing to perceive
exterior objects, and another to receive knowledge: for, no part can give away to another
its inherent and proper particular nature” (141).
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Another method through which Cavendish investigates consciousness is to switch
among genres. Cavendish appreciates the possibilities of what she called “poetical” texts
or “fancy.” Creative endeavors such as writing, art, and performative pieces provide a
vital function in the development of reason. These arts can explore the consequences of
our view of reality with greater amplitude. She goes so far as to attach her fictional The
Description of the New World, Called the Blazing World to her philosophical work
Observations upon Experimental Philosophy and view them as integral parts. Lisa T
Sarasohn explains in her recent book The Natural Philosophy of Margaret Cavendish:
“For Cavendish, there is a continuum between science and fiction. Both are equally
important in elucidating her thought.”62 The Duchess maintains that philosophy and fancy
are equally the fruits of reason and that the full range of these disciplines is needed to
explore the human condition and consciousness.
I suggest that Cavendish’s texts, both fiction and nonfiction, point to the
importance of consciousness in two manners—by example and also by default. On the
positive side, since Margaret Cavendish’s ontology presupposes that all matter is
conscious, she meaningfully portrays alternative consciousnesses which have been
disempowered and voiceless in her world. She envisions a more just world with a more
balanced give and take of standpoints. She allows a glimpse of what may be missing from
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a society in which brute force predominates and some individuals are not allowed to
flourish. On the negative side, however, Cavendish’s writings depict the superior need for
hierarchy, monarchy, and patriarchy to keep a society of individual consciousnesses in
order. She presents arguments that we now see as classist, racist and ultimately
arrogant.63 These principles promote the status quo and disallow action and even dialogue
in many cases. For the Duchess, certain beings are imbued with a higher amount of
reason, a higher consciousness, and some are more imbued with power: these individuals
enjoy a greater ability to bring about change. Individuals with less knowledge and power
need to abide by the decisions made by their betters because if they do not, chaos will
result. Ultimately, whereas she offers a space for individual improvement through
knowledge and the fruits of discourse, she then limits that space by the mandate of higher
power and reason.
Tellingly, Cavendish can be seen as being made voiceless by the lack of published
English women authors in her time and disempowered by the inability to benefit from the
63

In her A True Relation of My Birth, Breeding, and Life found in Paper Bodies she
speaks of why her mother did not allow her to converse with the hired help: “Not because
they were servants were we so reserved, for many noble persons are forced to serve
through necessity, but by reason the vulgar sort of servants are as ill bred as meanly born,
giving children ill examples and worse counsel” (43). In her A Description of a New
World, Called the Blazing World, Cavendish describes her utopia as supporting “one
sovereign, one religion, one law, and one language, so that the world might be one untied
family, without divisions” (201). Her perfect society has place for variety only under
strictly controlled parameters, since this breeds discontent and war. Monarchy provides a
safe, secure world by suppressing faction between peoples of lower rank and quality.
This is the impetus for why the Empress made her native country in the parallel universe
“the absolute monarchy of all that world“ by annihilating all other countries’ navies and
destroying many of their towns and cities with fire. See p. 212-4.
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structured education that men of her class enjoyed. Nonetheless, she finds a way to
communicate her voice and hone her knowledge since she is both certain of her capacity
to think well and able to find the necessary support to publish in England. These
biographical elements inform her literary output and her philosophical thought. Through
her own persistence and her husband’s endorsement, she is given the literary space at
least to participate partially in the fervent debates of her time: specifically, on what
reason can secure, how reason can be used to understand the world, and how philosophy
affects the political. Reason, thus, became a cornerstone of Cavendish’s philosophy.
Reason, however, is exactly what her society tells her she cannot possess. Reason, mind,
knowledge, and consciousness are what the intellectuals of her time say a woman lacks:
no wonder Cavendish insists that their instruments and procedures only reach the exterior
and have no clue of the consciousness that strives from within. Her life and works clearly
contradict her culture’s social biases against women.
According to many scholars Cavendish develops and espouses a philosophy of
‘vitalist materialism.’64 Traditionally, philosophy and science have considered Vitalism
and Materialism as conflicting, even contradictory, points of view; therefore, a
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philosophical perspective termed ‘vitalist materialism’ requires some explanation. On the
one hand, Vitalism states that biochemical processes cannot solely explain the existence
of life; therefore, matter cannot account for the fact that living beings come into existence
and go out of existence. Matter is one thing; whereas how that stuff grows, lives, and
reproduces is a result of a vital spark or élan vital in each bio-organism. This spark is
separate from matter. They are two distinct elements. On the other hand, Materialism is
the philosophy based on monism, not dualism, such that all of matter is composed of
pieces which act together through various chemical processes or in other ways that can be
scientifically validated; all that exists in the universe comes from this matter. Even if we
do not know those processes, they exist and someday science will be able to comprehend
them. There are physical causes for every action. As such, there is no immaterial spirit
such as soul or mind that somehow superimposes itself on matter. In other words, natural
processes themselves explain all change. An élan vital is superfluous. What is more, an
élan vital is mysterious; science does not accept mysteries or miracles.
Pre-Socratic philosophers such as Thales, Anaxagoras, Epicurus and Democritus
establish the philosophical-scientific tenet that everything is physical and that no
supernatural entities are needed to explain what exists in the world. Lucretius writes his
1st century BCE poem De rerum natura explicating certain natural occurrences through
material processes in order to alleviate human fear of the supernatural and of death. He
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maintains that terror originates from too much belief in the mysterious65 hoping to
convince Gaius Memmius, a Roman judicial official to whom the poem is dedicated.
Lucretius also seems to have a larger didactic purpose: he wants to lead others to be more
rational and less superstitious about nonmaterial forces on the world.
Later, in the seventeenth century, materialists such as Hobbes and Cavendish
again hold the principle that everything is material. This is a main component in their
rebuttals of Cartesian dualism even though they are cognizant that this principle is risky
to hold while living under governments that tend towards theocracies. These materialist
philosophers are frequently accused of condoning or even promoting atheism because
God is unnecessary to the mechanics of the universe. Because of the repercussions these
accusations could bring, philosophers whose thought and work include mechanistic
processes often address the issue of just where God fit into their systems to avoid the
consequences of being branded atheist and suffering the attendant consequences. Then, as
now, the prevailing worldview put pressures on philosophers’ worldviews to create
syntheses between their systems of logic and their hierarchy of values.
At the same time that Cavendish works diligently to overcome her feminine lack
of formal education and thus develop a coherent philosophical system, being a woman
65

Lucretius, De rerum natura. “With the sweete honie of my verse to guild/ These
doctrines, if your thoughts could soe be held./ In fixt attention, while you see the good/
That will ensue, when nature’s understood/ By this our verse explaind…/…First I those
images of things explaine/ That to these other doctrines much perteine;/ Which falne
from things like membranes, here and there/ Doe always wander in the spatious ayre./
These terror in our waking thoughts excite,/ These fill our dreames with horror and
affright” (115).
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possibly shields her from having to defend her work on such fronts as the accusation of
atheism: her society’s belief in the assumed absence of a woman’s intellectual stature
allows her to present ideas men could not. As such, she actively involves herself in the
intellectual debates that during her time are stimulated by interaction with ancient
philosophers and authors. Nonetheless, she is often extremely reticent to identify which
books and authors, ancient or contemporary, she does study. By claiming erudition, she
would open herself to the accusation of her books actually being written by a man since
no woman could write with such knowledge and she would lose the justification to assert
her originality. Cavendish, at almost all times, wishes to claim extreme originality: “All
the materials in my head did grow/ All is my own and nothing do I owe.”66 Originality is
intimately tied to her concept of the three aspects of matter, having a higher degree of
rational matter could be seen as the fount of brilliance and innovation.
As a result of her reticence, it has been difficult for academics to trace her
influences. Some critics and historians take her at her word that she is an utter original.
Others seem almost to decide whom she reads by negative bibliography: if Cavendish
does not mention an author in a text, it is probable that Cavendish is under an anxiety of
influence and endeavoring to prove her original ideas. Vimala C. Pasupathi comments in
a chapter called “Old Playwrights, Old Soldiers, New Martial Subjects” from the book
Cavendish and Shakespeare: Interconnections: “If Cavendish intended to fashion herself
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as a writer isolated from outside influence, her protestations often suggest, rather than
deny the influence of other writers.”67
For instance, Emma L. E. Rees develops the theory in her book Margaret
Cavendish: Gender, Genre, Exile, that Cavendish takes Lucretius’s De rerum natura as a
springboard for her own fancy.68 Rees suggests that Cavendish’s Poems and Fancies uses
the model of the Lucretian poem to be able to present in a deceptively congenial way her
philosophical principles. “Both writers must, for public consumption, coat with poetic
honey the bitter pills of their respective projects.”69 Rees maintains that De rerum natura
establishes the precedent so that Poems and Fancies can be published at all,70 but that
nonetheless their projects are different; therefore, the resulting works of literature are
quite diverse. Rees goes on to explain:
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There is no academic agreement if it was possible for Cavendish to have read
Lucretius. See Emma Rees, Margaret Cavendish: Gender, Genre, Exile: “Wolfgang
Fleischmann makes the point that so great was Lucretius’s impact in the middle of the
seventeenth century that even self-professed enemies of the ideas of Epicurus and
Hobbes, such as the Cartesian Boyle, and the Anglican Glanvill, were not above
borrowing his atomist theories. Thus there is a strong argument for the inference that
what may perhaps be best defined as cultural osmosis was as responsible for Cavendish’s
understanding of Lucretius as a more direct or formal engagement could be” (57).
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Ibid. “Cavendish does share with Lucretius the status of a pioneer engaged in a
controversial and unpopular project: in his case, the dissemination of a radical
philosophy; in hers, the publication of a woman’s work. For Lucretius, poetry renders his
doctrine more palatable; for her it is a mode of expression which can be gendered as
specifically, and safely, feminine, and so can facilitate her first entry into print,” (61).
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This means at times she appears to be writing intentionally against the grain of
Lucretius’s argument, whilst still using his images as material for her own work.
In this suggestive relationship, form is as important as substance. Frequently, she
picks up on notions which Lucretius rejects, exploring them with as much
enthusiasm and reverence as she demonstrates for his positive hypotheses…In her
poems and in her fancies Cavendish writes in a Lucretian mode, even when,
substantively, her philosophy is at odds with his.71
Above all, Rees returns to her point that Lucretius afforded Cavendish the model in
which to poetically present her thoughts so the content could be accepted more easily.
Eileen O’Neill posits another example of Cavendish’s anxiety of influence when
she suggests that Cavendish’s philosophy may have its greatest parallel to the Stoics.
O’Neill, in her introduction to Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, gives a
substantial background to what subjects and authors Cavendish dedicates herself. O’Neill
underscores Cavendish’s lack of citations of her Stoic sources and her desire to be viewed
as an original:
Between 1664 and 1666 Cavendish was engaged in two intellectual
projects. The first was her critical reading of scholars working in dioptrics,
meteorology, hydrostatics, thermochemistry, and magnetic theory. Besides
the writings of Hobbes, Descartes, Digby, Van Helmont, and Charleton,
she also examined the experimental science of the members of the Royal
Society of London, especially the work of Robert Boyles (1627-91),
Robert Hooke (1635-1703), and Henry Power (1622-68). Second, she
attempted to master the natural philosophy of the ancients. Since she read
no Greek or Latin, she turned to Thomas Stanley’s The History of
Philosophy (1655-62), which provides paraphrases of the source material
for reconstructing the views of the various ancient sects. In her
publications that followed this period of study, she criticized the views of
Plato, Aristotle, Pythagoras, Epicurus, and the skeptics; but notably absent
was any discussion of the Stoics. It is possible that Cavendish’s silence

71

Ibid, (56).
39

here was fueled by the fear that her critics would charge her with a lack of
originality, arguing that she had simply repeated the views of the Stoics.
And if there was one ting Cavendish wanted as much as fame, it was to
have views that were as singular as her dress and manners…72

Once again, Cavendish’s lack of proper citing gives the strongest basis for positing
influence. Even though O’Neill alludes to Cavendish’s need to prove herself as
completely original, O’Neill does not develop why this is so except to state that it is a
rhetorical stance. O’Neill suggests that singularity is paramount to the 1655 Cavendish
because she does not want to be accused of not actually having written her texts.73 I will
eventually posit that Cavendish’s belief in the value of originality is intimately connected
to her philosophy’s tenet that all matter has reason and the best way to understand the
consciousness of reason is to develop what is unique in oneself to the highest degree.
Cavendish desires to debate on the issues with her contemporaries that they were
most intent on understanding whilst always developing as much originality as possible.
Even though her ideas share many elements with that of Hobbes and she was also
accused of being an atheist, her later philosophy is not grounded in an inert materialism
like his in which existence is composed of myriad lifeless pieces. In fact, she argues that
72
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within each bit of matter are three fused and inextricable elements: the inanimate,
sensitive, and rational. She writes: “there is such a conmixture of animate and inanimate
matter, that no particle in nature can be conceived or imagined, which is not composed of
animate matter, as well as of inanimate.”74 Since she determines that each particle of
matter is imbued with a rational element, she also believes that all matter essentially
contains some amount of consciousness. She reasons that matter is all that there is and it
is impossible for awareness to be either superimposed on matter or for it to appear
spontaneously; therefore consciousness in each piece of matter is the most logical
possibility. This turn was unusual, although not unique, for a thinker in the 17th century.75
As stated above, Margaret Cavendish is usually referred to as a ‘vitalist’
materialist; that is, a thinker who explains the universe as completely subject to matter’s
component parts and its attendant processes while also attributing life to some one thing
that cannot be ascribed to matter, an élan vital. This description of her thought, however,
can be seen as being at once too restrictive and too broad.76 It is too restrictive because
Cavendish does not assign rationality to just the living; she states that what we usually
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call the inanimate—that is rocks, stars, and the smallest pieces of matter—have
consciousness as well. To label her a ‘vitalist’ is too broad because it implies she is a
dualist rather than a monist. Her disavowal of a dualist system operating in our universe
is so strong that there are scholars investigating comparisons between the Duchess’s
philosophy and Leibniz monist view of existence.77 Cavendish sees rationality as an
aspect of matter itself by maintaining that it is integral aspect, not superimposed, and is
inseparable within each piece of matter. She explains: “those three degrees were so
inseparably conmixt in the body of nature, that none could be without the other in any
part or creature of nature, could it be divided to an atom.”78 Thus, rather than endorsing
the conclusion that Cavendish espoused a vitalist materialism, I suggest that she upholds
a ‘panpsychist’ materialism, meaning a system in which reason (and, thus, consciousness)
exists as a fundamental character in all matter throughout the universe. I will discuss this
in more detail below.
Cavendish views the obsessive belief in the power of science as hubris, such that
man values himself, his science, and his consciousness and rationality over all other
beings’ consciousnesses and the rational existence that Cavendish insisted all matter
possesses:
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Thus some learned do puzzle themselves and the world with useless
distinctions, into animate and inanimate creatures; and are so much afraid of
self-motion, as they will rather maintain absurdities and errors, than allow any
other self-motion in nature, but what is in themselves; for, they would fain be
above nature, and petty gods, if they could but make themselves infinite; not
considering that they are but parts of nature, as all other creatures: Wherefore I,
for my part, will rather believe as sense and reason guides me, and not
according to interest, so as to extol my own kind above all the rest, or above
nature herself.79
While Cavendish is deeply interested in what would come to be called “the Scientific
Revolution” and particularly the experiments performed at the Royal Society of London,
she is, however, skeptical of their methods and their true potentiality.80 Cavendish
criticizes the manipulation of Nature as a turning away from true wisdom.
At this point, a caveat is useful: As often happens when dealing with Cavendish,
her views on the Royal Society are much more complicated, however, than mere
rejection. She was, after all, the first woman that was invited to their building to observe
their work and experiments. This, however, happened after she had criticized them in
print. Her relationship with the Society includes contrasting elements of strong attractions
and repulsions which include her rank of nobility, the status of her husband and her late
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brother-in-law, her sex, her writings, the king’s favor, and her audacity. These all created
conflicting forces in the amount of acceptance offered to her by the Royal Society.
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Chapter Five: An Overview of how Margaret Cavendish’s Explorations Help
Further the Development of Intersubjectivity in Literature, and thus Consciousness
in Literature
I propose that Cavendish’s exploration of consciousness is a part of one of the
primary concerns and developments in literature in general, consciousness, especially if
we describe this search as dealing with the human condition, the flourishing of
individuals, and as self-definition of what it is to be a particular being. What is it like to
be alive and know that one is living? How is it different to be one person than another?
Can we learn from the mistakes other people have made? Am I a different person if
certain characteristics I have always embodied now change? How is who I am altered by
the people around me? By the society I live in? How do I change the world by living and
acting within it? What would I be like if I were no longer human? In sum, literature and
art explore what it is like to have consciousness and do so through an act of
consciousness upon matter.
Some current scholars of ancient texts claim that literature attests to changes in
human consciousness from Homer’s time to our own. Bruno Snell in his book Discovery
of the Mind in Greek Philosophy & Literature develops the case that on a close reading of
The Iliad and The Odyssey, the perception of the separation between oneself and others,
expressed in human self-consciousness, begins to come about, but that it is still
45

rudimentary.81 Snell explains that the eras of epic, lyric poetry, and drama
chronologically succeeded each other and were a direct reflection of the progressive
development of consciousness. The “chain-like series of events” in The Iliad was not an
artistic decision.82
Actually this feature of Homer’s style is a necessary function of the perspective in
which he discerns man, his life and his world. According to his view–and there
could be no other for him–a man’s action or perception is determined by the
divine forces operative in the world; it is a reaction of his physical organs to a
stimulus, and this stimulus is itself grasped as a personal act.83
Snell argues that people in Homer’s time perceived that the gods’ thoughts and actions
actually manifested themselves in human internal organs, thus creating people’s
emotions. Furthermore, they believed that human actions caused by those feelings create
a series of actions in a ripple effect. Homer truly perceived life as a chain of events and
this is why he wrote as he did.
Snell suggests by the development of his argument that literary artists can be the
impetus for the development of human consciousness; by artists giving voice to human
possibility they lead their peers to perceive the existence of new options. Snell furthers
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his case by stating that the lyric writers were the first to consider how the past and future
impinge upon an individual. He discusses the work of Sappho, Alcaeus, and Anacreon to
show how consciousness took another step:
The lyric writers are imaginative enough to contemplate many situations which do
not occur in actuality, and to experience fully the discrepancy between what is
possible and what is real, between their hopes and the cruel present, between
Being and Appearance. Nevertheless they do not picture perfection in the guise of
an ideal for which a man strives, or which one might adopt as a model for the
transformation of the world.84
The ability to “picture perfection” for possible models for transformation and, thus,
utopias, is another level in the development of consciousness. Margaret Cavendish wrote
her own vision of a perfect world in The Blazing World (1666), following in the tradition
of Plato’s Republic (c. 380 BCE), Thomas More’s Utopia (1516), and Francis Bacon’s
New Atlantis (1627).
Snell claims Sappho, Alcaeus, and Anacreon innovatively introduce new temporal
levels into their poetry through memories and hopes for the future, and they develop
nonmaterial space by depicting people who are absent from one another but nonetheless
commune through their common emotion of missing each other:
In the expression of their private sentiments and demands the early lyrists try to
reproduce those moments in which the individual is all of a sudden snatched out
of the broad stream of life, when he senses that he is cut off from the ever-green
tree of universal growth. Such are the moments which furnish man with his first
glimpse of the soul.85
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Snell is careful to say the “first glimpse of the soul” since he does not believe that the
lyric poets have as yet become sufficiently self-conscious to realize a consciousness. This
is an ambiguous statement since Snell seems to maintain a mind and body dichotomy;
therefore, it can either mean that the poets have a soul of which they are not conscious or
that they do not yet possess a fully formed soul.
If he were a materialist like Cavendish this lack of consciousness would mean that
their matter is not developed sufficiently for deeper self-awareness to emerge and is as
such a not fully formed “soul.” Snell does address this and seems to believe they did in
fact have souls of which they were not yet fully conscious:
That the lyric poets put the non-physical in a separate category cannot, indeed, be
cogently shown by citing the words ‘soul’ and ‘mind’, for our fragmentary
material does not permit such conclusions, and perhaps the new ideas had not yet
crystallized sufficiently to compel the coining of new terns for things spiritual.
But a turn of speech here, and another there, allow us to state with some
conviction that the lyrists had ceased to interpret the soul only by analogy with the
physical organs.86
Thus, the lyric poets performed the huge cognitive leap of differentiating their emotions,
feelings, and actions from that of their environment. The consequence of this advance in
consciousness is that a sense of responsibility for one’s own actions begins to become
apparent; a sense of morality develops. There is a deeper sense of how one’s actions
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affect other beings and objects in the environment, a more exact inner representation of
one’s existence in space and time.
Snell advocates for the view that consciousness is pro-active, has an innerdirected urge to obtain knowledge that more and more adequately maps itself upon the
world. Some individuals have the capacity to open the human worldview to more
effective means of being aware. Snell, thus, asserts that the very depth of human
consciousness altered as a result of Sappho, Alcaeus, and Anacreon. I assert that this
view of knowledge and consciousness is similar to Cavendish’s. For the Duchess,
individuals that are composed of a higher ratio of rational aspects and who develop these
through their life are the natural leaders, the natural monarchy. I propose that this is a
large component of Cavendish’s obsession with fame.87 Fame is the acknowledgement by
others that one has contributed to the good of humanity.
Snell investigates how consciousness develops through literature’s ability to point
out possibilities, whereas other literary scholars are investigating how writing changes
our way of interacting and still others how literacy itself changes individual
consciousnesses and cultures at large. They discuss the characteristics of different genres
such as detective, psychological, or postmodern novels and the merits of literary points of
view such as first-person, omniscient, or even second-person. These can be viewed as
explorations of differing states of consciousness. What can a character know? What can a
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human being know? What do these investigations teach us about who we are and how we
interact with our environment?
Consequently, literature recognizes point of view as embodying an essential
element of entering into someone’s consciousness. Exactly who has access to
consciousness matters. George Butte argues that it is only in a female writer born one
hundred years after Cavendish’s death, Jane Austen, did deep intersubjectivity first comes
into literature.88 That is, Austen in her novels is the first to be able to portray the
interactions of different characters’ consciousnesses and how these affect and change the
action of the story. Consciousness of another’s consciousness and that the other is
conscious of how the first subject is affected in turn, create an interconnectivity of
feelings and actions. “Deep intersubjectivity has made its appearance in storytelling in
modern culture, and it has altered our sense of self and community and the discourses that
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construct and reflect them.”89 In essence, Butte is saying that literature has led the way
again to a deepening of consciousness and possibly even a widening of qualia. This is
important to my thesis that Cavendish prizes the search for knowledge by direct and
holistic means that incorporate both our senses and our reason not only because it values
a deepening sense of self, but also because some academics suggest that Cavendish’s
work was a precursor to such intersubjective novels as those of Jane Austen.90
Another Cognitive Literary Study theorist, Susan Zunshine, goes the next step in
parsing the development of consciousness in literature. In Why We Read Fiction: Theory
of Mind and the Novel, Zunshine maintains that Virginia Woolf further develops
literature’s ability to explore consciousness’ capacity to map out the embedding of
characters’ mental states as they interact reciprocally and intersubjectively. Patricia
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Cohen in her article “Next Big Thing in English: Knowing They Know that You Know”
explains Zunshine’s stance:
“Humans can comfortably keep track of three different mental states at a time,”
Ms. Zunshine said. For example, the proposition “Peter said that Paul believed
that Mary liked chocolate” is not too hard to follow. Add a fourth level, though,
and it’s suddenly more difficult. And experiments have shown that at the fifth
level understanding drops off by 60 percent, Ms. Zunshine said. Modernist
authors like Virginia Woolf are especially challenging because she asks readers to
keep up with six different mental states, or what the scholars call levels of
intentionality.91
Zunshine investigates some of Woolf’s techniques for dramatically portraying socially
fraught trains of thought and how one consciousness is able to actively and concurrently
keep track of so many states in herself and others. Interestingly, Zunshine contends that
one important aspect to being able to track many states is the ability to accept that the
characters are trustworthy and not to be doubted. Doubting another’s conscious state adds
another level of intention and is therefore more complicated.92
Cognitive Literary Study theorists esteem scientific theory and link their work to
its tenets. This tendency is important for my thesis because Cavendish also values science
to the point of setting up her own experiments and utilizing scientific findings in her
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texts, but even more so because of how these relate to human flourishing and
consciousness. From our current scientific point of view, the ability for a long-living
species to maintain a cognitive map of other individuals’ intentions is an evolutionary
advantage. From a particular consciousness’s perspective, the advantage may be seen as a
possibility for more happiness or an abundance of qualia, those moments that allow an
individual to truly feel he or she exists.
Zunshine uses the concept from cognitive psychology called Theory of Mind or
ToM to advance her cognitive literary studies thesis that applying scientific results “into
literary studies by showing how their research into the ability to explain behavior in terms
of the underlying states of mind—or mind-reading ability—can furnish us with a series
of surprising insights into our interactions with literary texts.”93 Zunshine believes we are
hard-wired to mind-read, to try to understand other people’s intentions. Our
consciousness actively seeks to understand consciousnesses found in our environment. It
is a way to keep ourselves safe and it is a way to just have fun. She explains, “I advance
and explore a series of hypotheses about cognitive cravings that are satisfied—and
created!—when we read fiction.”94
Cavendish would have appreciated this view of literature as satisfying
cognitive cravings and being enjoyable. In one of her prefaces to The Description of the
New World, Called the Blazing World, she stresses:
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But fictions are an issue of man’s fancy, framed in his own mind,
according as he pleases, without regard, whether the thing he fancies, be
really existent without his mind or not; so that reason searches the depth
of nature, and enquires after the true causes of natural effects; but fancy
creates of its own accord whatsoever it pleases, and delights in its own
work. The end of reason, is truth; the end of fancy, is fiction: But
mistake me not, when I distinguish Fancy from Reason; I mean not as if
Fancy were not made by the Rational parts of Matter; but by Reason I
understand a rational search and enquiry into the causes of natural
effects; and by Fancy a voluntary creation or production of the Mind,
both being effects, or rather actions of the rational part of Matter; of
which, as that is a more profitable and useful study then this; so it is also
more laborious and difficult, and requires sometimes the help of Fancy,
to recreate the Mind, and withdraw it from its more serious
contemplations.95
Cavendish claims that both our knowledge and pleasure centers need to be nourished;
they equally exist as aspects of the mind and rational matter. She implies that one without
the other causes imbalance in the individual, in his or her consciousness. They are both
needed for the development of knowledge.
Cognitive Literary Studies theorists point to the question of how consciousness
creates art and how works of art affect consciousness. Zunshine attests:
Thus when I refer to Woolf’s or Richardson’s or P. D. James’s experimentation
with their readers’ ToM and/or metarepresentational ability, what I really claim is
that they push to their limits certain aspects of the general, constant, ongoing
experimentation with the human mind that constitutes the process of reading and
writing fiction.96
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These theorists work in the interface between literary criticism, philosophy of mind, and
neuroscience. They accept as a principle that there is an evolutionary process involved in
consciousness and seem to question where the writing and reading of literature will take
humanity.
Snell, Butte and Zunshine maintain that the development of literature has a
corresponding heightening in consciousness. As such, if consciousness is seen as the
software we use to interface with the hardware of matter, these literary critics seem to say
that our software has self-reflective feedback loops that upgrade the system. Literature
and other artistic enterprises have become instigators in evolutionary processes in
humans. Butte and Zunshine specifically concentrate on the development of the novel
and synchronous cognitive abilities of consciousness. Cavendish’s contribution to the
novel has not yet received its proper due although literary critics are now studying The
Blazing World, her anti-romances such Assaulted and Pursued Charity and even Sociable
Letters.97
Whereas these theorists investigate more scientifically what happens in the brain
when we read literature, creative writers and artists wield matter in order to express what
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they perceive through their consciousness. They materially explore what it is to be
conscious and how to manifest their intuitions and findings. Artists explore through their
mediums the qualia of consciousness, the what-it-is-likeness of existence. As such,
Shakespeare, Austen, and Woolf express in words what they perceive to exist in the
world. They create works that speak to our consciousnesses in such a way that we are
able almost magically to imagine ourselves as someone else.98
Moreover, as Martha Nussbaum explains in Poetic Justice, these great writers
create our entryway into others’ consciousnesses in a manner that is safe to our bodies,
but at the same time rather subversive to the status quo. In great literary texts, we are not
in worlds that are completely comfortable to us and in this way they can transform our
consciousness.
Another way of putting this point is that good literature is disturbing in a
way that history and social science writing frequently are not. Because it
summons powerful emotions, it disconcerts and puzzles. It inspires
distrust of conventional pieties and exacts a frequently painful
confrontation with one’s own thoughts and intentions. One may be told
many things about people in one’s own society and yet keep that
knowledge at a distance. Literary works that promote identification and
emotional reaction cut through those self-protective strategems,
requiring us to see and to respond to many things that may be difficult to
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confront—and they make this process palatable by giving us pleasure in
the very act of confrontation.99
Good literature is subversive and often deals with real problems that rattle our conscious
minds from day to day.
Margaret Cavendish appreciates the subversiveness of literature. Sylvia
Bowerbank and Sara Mendelson link her reactionary texts to her ability to occupy two
contradictory stations at once in their introduction to Paper Bodies: A Margaret
Cavendish Reader: “The paradox [her ability to transcend the rigid categories of gender
and class] begins to recede when we realize that her works illuminate the most significant
preoccupations of her society precisely because she played with, probed, ridiculed or
rejected the dominant assumptions that structured early modern beliefs and behavior.”100
In her writings, Cavendish questions why society was the way it was and imagines new
possibilities for how it could be. She is certain that she possesses reason and she is highly
cognizant that many in power question if a woman could ever possess any real intellect;
therefore, in essence what she does is correlate reason to the presence of mind, to the
capacity for awareness and suggests it is a matter of innate degree and attained
knowledge. This is subversive to the hierarchy of power in her lifetime even if she holds
monarchy in the highest esteem because it allows for intelligence where society as a
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whole maintained there could be none. Cavendish seems to believe that Nature herself
creates beings who are naturally aristocratic and these individuals owe it to the world and
to themselves to develop their innate capabilities. We today may not appreciate her
particular desire for hierarchy, but we can delight in the power of her subversive writings
and her desire to imagine a utopia where she gives a voice to the ostensibly powerless
and acknowledges consciousness in the apparently dumb.
Why does this matter? Why should we want to give voice to the inarticulate?
Ultimately, a world in which we have a better understanding of all types of consciousness
would allow us the foundations on which to live in ways that are healthier and more
respectful for everyone and everything. In other words, it would help to ensure dignity for
all, instead of for the few. It would encourage we humans to take responsibility for our
actions and not allow us to ignore our role as integral to the health and well-being of all
of the universe. I aver, and suggest that Cavendish would support me, that believing we
stand apart is not truly supported by the science of consciousness and that our attempt to
lord over all creation is not supported by philosophy. Literary texts allow, in a way that
straight science cannot, opportunities to explore what could be possible in our existence
and experiment with what consciousness is. This is true today and was true when
Margaret Cavendish was writing and experimenting with numerous genres.
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Chapter Six: Margaret Cavendish, her writing
Margaret publishes her first book, Poems and Fancies, in 1653. The bulk of my
presentation on her views of consciousness will come from this text since it covers many
topics and is almost an overview of all the themes she would address in the years ahead.
This is not to say that some of her tenets do not change—the characteristics of elements
such as atoms, vacuum, and “the kernel of the brain” alter strongly—but her desire to
have an active understanding of intellect, how humans use reason to move around in the
world, and an overall structure that includes mind, bodily sensation, and the building
blocks of matter is always paramount. As such Poems and Fancies is a good place to
start.
It is also important to underline that from the beginning “fancy” was as important
as reason: intellect is not as superior as often supposed for it does not have the capacity to
imagine alternative ways of being if it is not supported by fancy. Literature and art are as
crucial to human flourishing as reason and science. She also places a high importance on
how “patterning,” the copying of patterns throughout creation, is the method through
which bits of matter interact with other bits of matter. Cavendish holds that each body’s
senses or perceptions “pattern” out information from other substances and use this
knowledge to reason how the individual should proceed. This is a consequence of her
strong materialism—the physical body is absolutely part of each being’s consciousness:
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she does not maintain a Cartesian mind-body dualism. Since individual bits of matter all
contain reason, Cavendish assumes that chaos could easily be the result; however, since
we have a rather ordered world, she also assumes that there is a great deal of dialogue or
communication in the universe between beings which results in creating harmony. As
such, because of the transference of patterns and the relative harmony of the world,
dialogue and discourse become extremely vital. Poems and Fancies contains much poetry
that is set up as conversations.
One particularly interesting poem as far as consciousness is concerned is “A
World in an Eare-Ring.” Claire Jowitt connects the poem to the famous portrait of Queen
Elizabeth by Marcus Gheeraerts the Younger called the “Ditchley” portrait.101 Jowitt
suggests that many English subjects during the Restoration looked back upon the reign of
Queen Elizabeth as a golden time. For Cavendish, however, there was the added element
that Elizabeth was a woman who occupied the ideal position: she had power, was famous,
and cultivated the perception that her body was England: the monarch’s consciousness
carried the country to its greatest heights.102
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On another level, however, the poem is about different consciousnesses existing
in the same space almost in parallel times or dimensions. Margaret sets up in the poem
the possibility of worlds co-existing in close quarters without one being aware that the
other exists.
There Markets bee, and things both bought, and sold,
Know not the price, nor how the Markets hold.
There Governours do rule, and Kings do Reigne,
And Battels fought, where many may be slaine.
And all within the Compasse of this Ring,
And yet not tidings to the Wearer bring.
Within the Ring wise Counsellors may sit,
And yet the Eare not one wise word may get.103
Here in “A World in an Eare-Ring.” are parallel consciousnesses that have no perception
of each other’s existence.
Or could it be that the smaller, more dependent world is aware of its state of
relying on the other? This makes sense from a sociological perspective since people in
positions of subordination utilize their rational abilities to create “antennas” for the
movements of their superiors. Cavendish portrays this dynamic in her play The Religious.
The heroine Lady Perfection, as her name denotes, is of the aristocracy. Her principle
concern is with how she can always do what is right to the best of her ability, to be
virtuous. She does not know many of the people who are in the lower classes. Mistress
Odd-Humour, the daughter of a workingman, not only knows Lady Perfection but also
when her wedding day is supposed to be and other facts about the Lady. In this play,

103

Margaret Cavendish, “A World in an Eare-Ring,” Poems and Fancies, (45).
61

Cavendish depicts other differentials in power relations as well—the lower class is
vigilant to the upper class’s movements, children to their parents, and women to men.
She sees consciousness as working economically; people pay active attention to what can
most affect their quality of life and what has a low probability to cause disruption to their
lives will not be actively attended.
Once again, Cavendish has a deep understanding of Nature. Current science holds
that predator and prey employ similar economic survival techniques in their environment:
an individual searches out certain phenomena with its consciousness depending on its
ecological niche. Predators utilize the ability to focus their consciousness on a single
animal that they view as the weakest in order to be able to hunt successfully. For this,
they have evolved a section of the retina called the fovea that allows clear, accurate, and
detailed vision. Prey, on the other hand, have an open, general focus in order to spy
trouble that comes from any direction. Their eyes are even set farther apart on the head in
order to allow a wider range of vision. They need to be aware of more phenomena
generally.
As Robert Procter emphasizes in his book Agnotology: The Making and
Unmaking of Ignorance, an individual makes conscious and unconscious decisions about
which factors are going to be held actively in consciousness: “Part of the idea is that
inquiry is selective. We look here rather than there; we have the predator’s fovea (versus
the indiscriminate watchfulness of the prey), and the decision to focus on this is therefore
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invariably a choice to ignore that.”104 Consciousness and being aware that one is aware
carries a cost in energy. The powerful are going to have a different type of focus of
awareness than the weaker. Cavendish was conscious of this fact. This is why Mistress
Odd-Humour knows about Lady Perfection: since she is of a subservient, lower social
status, it is in her best interest to keep tabs on the actions of those who are above her.
Lady Perfection, on the contrary, needs to stay focused on perfecting her virtue and,
therefore, is less cognizant of other “noise” in her environs.
Returning to the “Eare-ring,” Cavendish alludes to different social spheres and
how with a simple flick of the sovereign’s hand countless lives can be affected and even
destroyed. This is also a reference to her power. In the Ditchley portrait, Queen Elizabeth
stands upon a map of England. Cavendish seems particularly cognizant of how a change
of focus can bring about the lack of awareness that other consciousnesses even exist.
Sometimes these others are instrumentalized like the earring or like the map; they
become mere objects in a worldview. The powerful bring about life-altering events in the
lives of the voiceless even without the knowledge that they have done so.
Cavendish intimately knows that men were looking at women and assuming that
there was little intellect, “nothing was really happening” in their brains. She, herself,
claims umbrage for any deficiencies of her work in this supposed faulty nature of women
in various passages. For example she implores, “but your goodness and civility being as
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great as your learning, would rather conceal, than discover or laugh at those weaknesses,
and imperfections which you know my sex is liable to”105 written to the men at the “Most
Famous University of Cambridge” and also the following to all professors: “I pray
Consider my Sex and Bredding, and they will fully Excuse those Faults which must
Unavoidably be found in my Works.”106 Furthermore being a shy person she knows that
people often assumed that she is a simpleton. These mistaken opinions contradict her own
view of the value of her thinking process; she knows that appearances and unexamined
judgments can deceive. Perhaps, this is the basis for how she could look around herself
and believe that there is consciousness where we do not even know it exists. In the end,
she sees consciousness as a result of the complicated forces of gender, learning, society,
birth (which today she would probably call genetics), humors, wit, virtue, and life
choices.
Hilda L. Smith explains in her essay “Margaret Cavendish and the False
Universal” that Margaret “does not, as most of those in her century did—and as the
majority of scholars continue to do today—establish standards for judging women by
criteria based on either a distinct nature or distinct place in society.”107 I suggest that
Cavendish has layers to how she envisions the nature of humans in general, and women
or men in particular. On one layer, she maintains a type of essentialism as far as souls and
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gender are concerned. On another, there are some characteristics in which all humans
partake with other substances; that is, consciousness. She seems to envision a nesting of
characteristics in each individual that starts from the most basic, the existence of
consciousness with sensate and inanimate matter at every level, to more and more
processes within the substance (ability to grow and procreate), to the ability to transport
oneself, to the ability to use reason in a sustained and effective way to for envisioning
and being in the world. Finally, individuals embody such characteristics as gender, and I
would aver, a quality-of-being that results from the ratio of the rational, sensate, and
inanimate aspects of matter coupled with learning from individual life experiences, the
highest or finest of which would be a noble quality-of-being. This creates a natural
monarchy that does not consist exclusively of men.
This hierarchy does, however, consist of individuals who are utterly unique; this, I
suggest is Cavendish’s grounding for her privileging of individuality and may be the
origin of some of her literary flourishes. Smith, for example, comments on Cavendish’s
propensity for rhetoric that contains a “movement from ignorance to exclusion” and that
“she begins an argument at one point and ends up at quite a different one.”108 To take a
case in point, Cavendish begins one of her lines of reasoning by saying that women are
guileless when it comes to most areas of public life as if it were somehow a deficit
residing in women; her next step, however, is to change the playing field by saying that
feminine lack of knowledge actually stems from a society that excludes women from
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participation and thus its origin lies other where than in their very sex. Here, Smith is
actually making six points: 1) Cavendish constructs arguments with contradictions,
exaggerations, circular reason and other constructions that are not accepted in standard
logic; 2) Cavendish probably employs such untraditional forms deliberately and
subversively; 3) Cavendish has a strong opinion that culture is constructed by people and
does not have to be as it is in practice; 4) access to learning is controlled by those who are
in power; 5) those who are in power are men; and, finally, 6) only rarely is there a woman
monarch or a woman with power. This explains why Queen Elizabeth is such a
fascinating subject for Cavendish since she was a woman with power over many
consciousnesses and material goods.
“A Dialogue betwixt Learning, and Ignorance”109 is a poem in conversational
form that plays on the various advantages to the individual in not knowing, in ignorance.
Cavendish gives voice to her philosophical tenet that we are not able to maintain
(sometimes we cannot even entertain) some knowledge in our consciousnesses, such as
the impossibility of knowing God, all of nature, or other mysteries. Accepting this fact
can help release us from worldly cares, save us from the despair that can result from the
effort and futility of learning only to lose all knowledge in death, and relieve us of the
anguish caused by the fact that we were happier in Eden then we could ever be after the
Fall. Cavendish also states the obvious reality that many people choose not to expend the
energy required for education and the development of a strong appreciation for strict
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reason; this is often to be attributed to laziness and a desire to not accept personal
responsibility. This dialogic poem suggests that human flourishing has a complicated
relationship with learning and ignorance. The study of ignorance, of how and why we
decide not to develop and maintain certain objects of learning of our environment only
recently received a name, Agnotology. Cavendish perceptively saw four centuries ago
that it is an important aspect and function of our consciousness.
“A Dialogue Between an Oake and a Man cutting him downe”110 is another poem
in dialogue between a large, ancient and stately tree with the owner of the land who has
come to cut it down. The oak tree puts forth many arguments about why the man should
let him stand. The man retorts with utilitarian reasons that the oak is more valuable dead
than alive. When the man asks: “Why do you wish to live, and not to dye,/ Since you no
Pleasure have, but Misery?”, the oak replies: “Yet I am happier, said the Oake, then
Man;/ With my condition I contented am.” Cavendish suggests that even though it is
unusual that the man could even sense that the tree talks to him, his hubris still insists on
being the arbiter of what has value and what does not, and then on ultimately possessing
the decision of who shall live and who shall die. The poem ends with the following
strophe:
Alas, poore Oake, thou understandst, nor can
Imagine halfe the misery of Man.
All other Creatures onely in Sense joyne,
But Man hath something more, which is divine.
He hath a Mind, doth to the Heavens aspire,
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A Curiosity for to inquire:
A Wit that nimble is, which runs about
In every Corner, to seeke Nature out.
For She doth hide her selfe, as fear’d to shew
Man all her workes, least he too powerfull grow.
Like to a King, his Favourite makes so great,
That as the last, he feares his Power hee-ll get.
And what creates desire in Mans Breast,
A Nature is divine, which seekes the best:
And never can be satisfied, until
He, like a God, doth in Perfection dwell.
If you, as Man, desire like Gods to bee,
I’le spare your Life, and not cut downe your Tree.
Here, again, Cavendish condemns man’s hubris in believing that he is the only being with
reason and, thus, jumping from this mistaken belief to the further insolence that his mind,
his consciousness, gives him a higher access to divinity, to royalty, and to the right to
abuse his power. Ultimately, man acts in self-interest, a self-interest which based on
mistaken premises creates unimaginable destruction throughout the world.
Poems and Fancies ends with the eleven-page allegory “The Animal Parliament”
on how the mind rules over the body and spirit. At least to our modern ear, the title is a
misnomer: there are no animals in this parliament. The elements of the allegory are
actually different aspects such as thoughts and virtues inside the mind of a single, wellruled human. “The Soul called a Parliament in his Animal Kingdom, which Parliament
consisted of three parts, the Soul, the Body, and the Thoughts; which are Will,
Imagination, and Passions.” 111 The piece portrays a whole session where the King rules
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while different aspects bring matters of state to consciousness. Different issues are raised,
debated, and finally the king rules on what is to be accepted and what not. This is
important for two reasons: how Cavendish in the piece sees the King as residing in the
brain with a view reminiscent of Descartes and his pineal gland, and the negotiations that
go on are in agreement with Dennett’s view on how the brain decides which objects of
the environment and the self are brought into consciousness and how the body maintains
homeostasis.
Cavendish says about the brain: “The Head is the upper House of Parliament,
where at the upper end of the said House sits the Soul King, in a Kernel of the Braine,
like to a Chaire of State by himselfe alone, and his Nobility round him.”112 Here, she is
imagining through her fancy Descartes’ supposition presented in The Passions of the
Soul: the pineal gland is the place in the brain where the soul interacts with the body.
Cavendish slowly rejects Descartes’ premise. In later texts, Cavendish makes light of this
belief and more than ten years later, she opposes this view absolutely in both
Observations upon Experimental Philosophy113 and Philosophical Letters.114 “The
Animal Parliament” develops what this Cartesian arena in the mind would be like. The
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key aspects of which Cavendish would always maintain: the dialogic process whose
decisions are ultimately the arbiter of what comes into full, bodily consciousness.
This brings us to the second point: Daniel C. Dennett in his book Sweet Dreams:
Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness calls this arena where impressions
come in and a mandating force presides the “Cartesian theater in the mind.” He uses this
term derogatorily since he insists that the whole view that there is a little person, the
homunculus, in the brain who decides what to bring to consciousness and what is most
rational is not sustained by neuroscience.
And as I have argued at length…, this imagined showcase, the Cartesian
Theater, where everything comes together for consciousness, must be
dismantled. All the work done by the imagined homunculus in the Cartesian
Theater must be distributed among various lesser agencies in the brain, none of
which is consciousness. Whenever that step is taken, however, the Subject
vanishes, replaced by mindless bits of machinery unconsciously executing their
tasks.115
By personifying the process the brain follows, Cavendish is actually able to ideate a
mental picture very much like the one Dennett depicts above. There are processes, very
much like legal or parliamentary procedures, the brain performs to decide which pieces of
information need to become present to the conscious mind. The difference of course is
Cavendish sustains that rationality is present in all bits of matter. In this way, her
presenting a court where different aspects like lords and bishops need to clamor to be
heard through reason of their argument or the passion of their speech begins to explain
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Cavendish’s obsession with fame. She presents fame as the way certain thoughts,
memories, or passions gain dominance in the body and the way certain people gain
ascendence in history. She envisions a dialogue or a parliamentary process that decides
which elements should be honored.
The book CCXI Sociable Letters includes passages where Cavendish presents 211
short pieces in epistolary form that deal with many topics from day-to-day life to create
one side of a dialogue between esteemed correspondents. The “sociability” aspect is
important to Cavendish: life is not a solitary existence, but a continual interplay between
consciousnesses. The events she relates are a few experiences in Antwerp, her sense
impressions, her memories, and her conclusions about what it is to flourish. The
magistrate of her mind, the consciousness who keeps track of the goings-on and sense
impressions from her experiences, correlates the impressions of these perceptions with
reason to create thoughts worth reading and cherishing:
And thus Her thoughts, the Creatures of her Mind,
Do Travel through the World amongst Mankind,
And then Return, and to the Mind do bring
All the Relations of each several thing;
And Observation Guides them back again
To Reason, their Great King, that’s in the Brain;
Then Contemplation calls the Senses straight,
Which Ready are, and Diligently Wait
Commanding Two these Letters for to Write,
Touch in the Hand, as also the Eye-sight,
These Two the Soul’s Clerks are which do Inscribe,
And Write all Truly down, having no Bribe.
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She presents reason and contemplation as the qualities she employs throughout the book
to process the questions and comments that her epistolary interlocutors pose to her. The
mind, or the consciousness, relies on reason which observes and describes thought
processes and on contemplation which observes and describes sensory perceptions.
Together these two gather the rational and sensory phenomena that the consciousness
then processes to give the self a more true account of the world.
Observations on Experimental Philosophy is much more scholarly than Poems
and Fancies or CCXI Sociable Letters. This is where Cavendish endeavors to relate a
much more systematic body of thought about how the world is composed. She presents
an even stronger materialist position than previously, thus giving an account of how and
why she reasoned that matter is made of three “degrees.” Even here, however, she often
presents her argument in the form of a dialogue between different parts of her
consciousness. For Cavendish, knowledge always consists of the body, reason and a
social connection:
The first difference did arise about the question, How it came, that
matter was of several degrees, as animate and inanimate, sensitive and
rational? For, my latter thoughts would not believe that there was any
such difference of degrees of matter: To which my former conceptions
answered, that nature, being eternal and infinite, it could not be known
how she came to be such, no more than a reason could be given how
God came to be: For nature, said they, is the infinite servant of God, and
her origin cannot be described by any finite or particular creature; for,
what is infinite, has neither beginning nor end; but that natural matter
consisted of so many degrees as mentioned, was evidently perceived by
her effects or actions; by which it appeared first, that nature was a selfmoving body, and that all her parts and creatures were so too: Next, that
there was not only an animate or self-moving and active, but also an
inanimate, that is, a dull and passive degree of matter; for if there were
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no animate degree, there would be no motion, and so no action nor
variety of figures; and if no inanimate, there would be no degrees of
natural figures and actions, but all actions would be done in a moment,
and the figures would all be so pure, fine, and subtle, as not to be subject
to any grosser perception, such as our human, or other the like
perceptions are. This inanimate part of matter, said they, had no selfmotion, but was carried along in all the actions of the animate degree,
and so was not moving, but moved; which animate part of matter being
again of two degrees, viz. sensitive and rational, the rational being so
pure, fine and subtle, that it gave only directions to the sensitive, and
made figures in its own degree, left the working with and upon the
inanimate part, to the sensitive degree of matter, whose office was to
execute both the rational part’s design, and to work those various figures
that are perceived in nature; and those three degrees were so inseparably
commixt in the body of nature, that none could be without the other in
any part or creature of nature, could it be divided to an atom; for as in
the extruction of a house there is first required an architect or surveyor,
who orders and designs the building, and puts the labourers to work;
next the labourers or workmen themselves; and lastly the materials of
which the house is built: so the rational part, said they, in the framing of
natural effects, is, as it were, the surveyor or architect; the sensitive, the
labouring or working part; and the inanimate, the materials: and all these
degrees are necessarily required in every composed action of nature.116

Even though Cavendish advances her philosophical system, her trust in fancy and
learning through dialogue is so complete that she chooses a very literary style to convey
her convictions. It is as if she hopes that the dramatization of her thought process will be
enough to convince the reader that this is the only way nature and matter could possibly
be viewed.
As already stated, Cavendish attributes three intermixed aspects to all matter—
inanimate, sensitive, and rational. The three aspects coexist within small pieces of matter.
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They also work together with other small parts to form larger parts of matter. Even
though she does not elaborate on how they interact, she does enumerate some
characteristics. She explicates for what employment each of the three aspects is
responsible. She then advances that time is needed for more complex substances to come
to be in the world, strife is part of the dynamic, opposites create balance and harmony,
and discussion and social interaction are essential for all creation. Since all matter has
reason, interaction is needed even between small organisms and small pieces of matter.
Sometimes arbitration becomes necessary to foment peace and agreement and allay
discord.
Cavendish continues on to explain how nature and individual consciousnesses
interact. Nature is eternal and infinite; therefore, we as finite beings cannot hope to
understand the infinite. Every piece of matter has some rational understanding as a result
of being made up of the three aspects of rational, sensate, and inanimate. Even though
rationality allows knowledge to come about, by definition each individual’s
consciousness of the whole is incomplete. The sensate aspect performs all movement that
the rational informs it to do. The inanimate aspect makes up all the building blocks of
existence that the sensate moves and the rational informs. If there were only animate
degrees of matter, there would be no “natural figures and actions,” no mixed compounds
or more complex organisms. Movement would be instantaneous. It would be interesting
to know what Cavendish thought would happen to time and also consciousness if this
were the case.
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As I mentioned above, since the rational instantiates what is most pure in nature
in Cavendish’s thought, a person that is noble therefore possesses more rational aspects
as compared to sensitive and inanimate. Does this then create a hierarchy of
consciousnesses and underscore Cavendish’s belief in monarchy? The Description of a
New World, Called the Blazing World is a good text to explore this dynamic in
Cavendish’s thought. The Blazing World was published as a companion piece to
Observations upon Experimental Philosophy. Cavendish sees them as complimentary
texts, the philosophical along with what she called the “romancical” and the
“fantastical.”117 In The Blazing World, when the ruler of the new world meets the
abducted nameless young lady, he quickly falls in love with her, marries her, and makes
her the Empress of all the land. In this purer world, which is actually where Paradise had
been before the Fall, her nobility is immediately apparent. Later, the Empress and the
literary character Margaret Cavendish’s souls or consciousnesses travel to the writer’s
world and eventually enter into the Duke’s body where the three have a platonic
communion of souls. Since the story is fantastical it is hard to know how these
occurrences should be interpreted, but it seems clear that certain souls or consciousnesses
are nobler and that an almost bodily communion can be achieved between the purer
beings.
Throughout Cavendish’s oeuvre there is a constant exploration of how the
individual develops her consciousness and a questioning about what are the best
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procedures to follow in order to achieve human flourishing. She presents a constant
emphasis on the interaction of the rational, the body’s senses, the stuff of the world, and
how these three interact, change each other, and grow. As a monarchist, Cavendish
esteems hierarchy and nobility; she appears to hold that different mixtures of the three
aspects of matter create quality of being. Unfortunately, this creates a diminishing of
certain individuals’ consciousnesses, even though in other texts Cavendish seems to
uphold the need in the world for all species and their equal value. Ultimately, I aver that
for Cavendish as it had been with the three aspects of matter, different beings fulfil the
roles to which they are most suited according to Nature’s plan. This also explains why
Cavendish has been a difficult figure for feminists to claim as their own—she argues for
the nobility of some feminine souls but seems to undervalue the quality of many
consciousnesses.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion
Margaret Cavendish was highly cognizant of how being a woman in her society
created many obstacles for her goal to become an intellectual figure, but rather than
become discouraged she endeavored to turn any impediments into benefits. It is as if she
took her culture’s assumption that women cannot think critically and are thus on the
intellectual par of brute beasts, and she upended that assumption: Cavendish was certain
she thought well and thus blamed her ignorant accusers. She essentially reasoned that
they could not see or appreciate womanly intelligence and that they therefore suffered
from hubris and often ignorance of the worse kind—an ignorance that masquerades itself
as knowledge. This insight became a cornerstone to the Duchess’s epistemology and
ontology: the fact that one does not perceive another’s reason and consciousness does not
signify the lack of either intelligence or self-awareness in that other being. Cavendish
reasoned that pervasive intellect is the very fount of order in the universe and
omnipresent sentience is the wellspring of community. All matter ultimately searches
towards self-preservation and thus towards holistic order. Even though Cavendish is also
au courant of a contrary drive towards chaos, her faith in reason entails that by necessity
knowledge holds that harmony is good. Reason strives for order in all things. Since all
bits of matter contain reason, order should eventually prevail.
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As such, Cavendish maintained an ambivalent attitude towards the developing
area of science. What she called Experimental Philosophy strove for knowledge and
order, but unfortunately did so through alienating and self-elevating techniques. Scientists
are mistaken when they believe that by understanding the exterior of an entity, they can
also comprehend the interior. And they suffer from hubris when they believe that the
information they garner from nature somehow gives them power over her. As I stated at
the beginning of this thesis: Cavendish believes that science’s goal to master the universe
through instruments and measurements will “ultimately reveal nothing but the futility of
trying to penetrate nature.”118 In its stead, she seems to have advocated the search for
understanding by more direct, interconnected, and holistic means: we should employ our
senses and reason, our bodies and brains, and our philosophy and imagination to build all
of ourselves the best world possible.
For Margaret Cavendish the development of consciousness through the use of
both our reason and our fancy is essential to a flourishing life. The Ethic of Reciprocity
expressed in the Christian “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” but
also in many other religious and secular forms, is based on the recognition that our
actions can be extremely damaging to other beings. And this is exactly because they are
beings, conscious beings. There is something worthy of devotion and consideration about
a conscious being.
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While listening to a speech given at Harvard in 2008 by another English woman
writer, J K Rowling, who like Cavendish is often criticized for her choice of genre and
her ability to draw a crowd, I saw why the attestation of consciousness to ourselves and
to others has such force. It is not just free will that is at issue, even though that is
immensely important; it is the need to be able to make a difference, to know that our
consciousness is not just a trick of nature but something more vital. It is a deeply held
conviction that when we are interacting with others in the world, we are interacting with a
consciousness, not just a inert piece of matter. We ask ourselves, could it really be that
our intuition that we have a consciousness and that other humans have one, too, merely a
result of software or hardware? Rowling underlines the fact that it seems we have some
responsibility because of interacting with other consciousnesses. Nonetheless, it is a gift
and a burden:
If you choose to use your status and influence to raise your voice on
behalf of those who have no voice; if you choose to identify not only
with the powerful, but with the powerless; if you retain the ability to
imagine yourself into the lives of those who do not have your
advantages, then it will not only be your proud families who celebrate
your existence, but thousands and millions of people whose reality you
have helped change. We do not need magic to change the world, we
carry all the power we need inside already: we have the power to
imagine better.119
Rowling highlights the celebration of existence. Cavendish, as well, unashamedly
searched after the state of being celebrated, of being remembered for the very fact that

119
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she lived and thought and wrote. Fame that creates the power to envision and bring about
a better world, power that embodies the capability to labor to make that vision a little
more possible: this is why consciousness and the pervasiveness of intellect were
paramount to Margaret Cavendish.
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